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The management disciplines in the 1990s have seen an extraordinary
preoccupation with human resource practices and organizational performance.' Any number of configurations are offered as the magic formula to
produce superior economic value added.2 However, employers have long
argued that, to be in a position to experiment with various workplace practices, they first need the removal of collective influence or institutional barriers that impair flexibility in the employment relationship. This argument
translates into the covert demand for unilateral control over contracts inclusive of the ability simply to terminate and replace at will. The New Zealand
Employment Contracts Act 1991 (ECA) is perhaps the boldest piece of
modem labor legislation that systematically dismantles prior employee
protections and replaces them with enticements to employers to seek aggressively radical changes to employment conditions.
This Article begins with a brief examination of the theoretical foundation for these employer behaviors followed by a review of the relevant sections of the ECA which encourage the pursuit of individual contracting. The
main body of the Article contains a statistical analysis of recently collected
data from New Zealand organizations. Here, we hypothesize that the ECA
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1. See Special Research Forum: Human Resource Management and Organizational
Performance,4 ACAD. MGMTr. J. 733, 1060 (1996).
2. The term "economic value added" (EVA) refers to financial returns beyond what
would be received by investing within current prevailing money markets.
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encourages a preference for individual contracts and that firms adopting the
opportunities provided by the legislation will report higher levels of profit
vis-a-vis employers who have not pursued this option. Indeed, this outcome
is the statutory intention of the Act.
WORKPLACE CONTROL AND LABOR LAW

In mature economies, employers struggle to come to terms with how
they might maintain effective control over workers.' The parameters of
these concerns stretch from ensuring what tasks workers should accomplish,
to the appropriate remuneration associated with such efforts. Where civil
society has yet to take root, employers are at liberty to use muscle and might
to obtain compliance from labor and general submission to a task environment defined upon unilateral terms. However, where the edifice of jurisprudence and broad ethical concerns have long been established, employers
turn to legal sanctions to justify and sustain their primary, if not sole, prerogative to determine employment conditions. Concomitant to these considerations, worker resistance, together with political intrusions by government, invariably establish institutional impediments which prevent
employers from exerting their unfettered will over workers.
Labor law is the terrain upon which these contradictions and conflicts
rage. Legislation is both the repository and reflection of social forces which
shape the employment relationship.4 Statutes and judge-made law provide a
dynamic tapestry upon which employers and workers struggle to service
their different agendas.' Nevertheless, these machinations do not cohere in a
mechanistic or predictable fashion. Statutes may stand as testimony to the
ascendancy of the victor in ideological wars fought in historical context, yet
judicial interpretation has frequently seen variance with statutory intentions.6 Additionally, we may recognize that labor laws are passed to achieve
a particular end. The researcher may therefore fruitfully ask two related
questions. First, do labor statutes unfold along expected and predicted dimensions and, second, have the more specific outcomes envisaged by the
statute been achieved? These questions are most apposite to the present
New Zealand environment, along with the period 1991, the year in which
the Employment Contracts Act was passed.
For Marx, the conundrum facing employers is how to turn labor power

3. M. BuRwoY, THEPOLITICSOFPRODUCTION (1985).
4. Robert Kagan, How Much Does Law Matter? Labor Law, Competition, and Waterfront LaborRelations in Rotterdam and U.S. Ports, 24 L. & Soc'Y REV. 35, 35-36 (1990).
5. RICHARD LEMPERT & JOSEPH SANDERS, AN INVrrATION TO LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE:
DESERT, DIsPuTEs AND DISTRIBUTION (1986).

6. See Ellen Dannin & Clive Gilson, Getting to Impasse: Negotiations Under the National Labor Relations Act and the Employment Contracts Act, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 917 (1997).
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into actual labor.' As variable capital, workers have the essential capacity to
develop minds of their own and to make choices regarding the extent of
their work efforts. The onset of scientific management at the turn of the last
century with the separation of conception of work from its execution attempted to induce both predictable and compliant worker behavior with
management of the workplace, yet even in the most asymmetrical employment environment between employer and worker, the quest for complete
workplace control by management remains elusive.8 Many theorists have
argued that, rather than search for overt effective control over workers, it is
far better to manufacture consent over a period of time.' Although it can be
argued that the search for consent in the employment relationship remains a
subtle method of control, the distinction between direct and indirect control
of the workplace is important." Direct and immediate control requires a disciplinary regime wherein the established parameters of behavior are likely
set out with policing and surveillance techniques formally articulated in
contracts and documents that can be tailored to individual workers. Consent-based management ideology is more likely to see a concentration on
"softer" practices that have little relationship to the initial form of contracting where workers may be encouraged continually to re-define their multiple roles and purpose. In many respects, this type of workplace environment
presupposes the right of management to alter working conditions independent of existing contracts. Nevertheless, the ECA unquestionably encourages
employers to pursue the former scenario as opposed to the latter.
THE ECA AND INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTS

In many respects, the ECA has little to say about the nature of employment regulation. It was drafted in a period of considerable ideological upheaval, with the new right gaining control of all aspects of its construction."
Its main objective was to introduce freedom of contract to encourage "an
efficient labor market.' 2 Although the ECA expresses no preference regarding individual or collective contracts, 3 the general expectation is that
the parties, particularly employers, will choose individual contracting over
collective representation. This is very much in line with neo-classical economic theory that drives the ECA, in particular that each party will seek its
7. 1 KARL

MARX, CAPITAL 173, 181 (1974).
8. HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK
INTHE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1974).
9. M. BuRAwOY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: CHANGES IN THE LABOUR PROCESS UNDER
MONOPOLY CAPITALISM (1979).
10. A. FRIEDMAN, INDUSTRY AND LABOUR: CLASS STRUGGLE AT WORK AND MONOPOLY
CAPITALISM (1977).

11. Ellen J. Dannin, We Can't Overcome? A Case Study of Freedom of Contract and
Labor Law Reform, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 168 (1995).
12. Employment Contracts Act, 1991 (N.Z.) [ECA].
13. ECA § 18(1)(a).
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own rational advantage.'" The Minister of Labour at the time of the passing
of the ECA, Bill Birch, re-calibrated his theoretical leanings in the following way:
That is what labour market reform is all about-increased productivity
and better ways of doing things, leading to better output, more exports,
better profits, a higher standard of living and better wages. That is the
bottom line. It is time for us to seek improvements in our work arrangements so
that we are more efficient, more productive and more export oriented. 5
Clearly, the notions of internal workplace flexibility and external market clearing go hand in hand. The assumption of rational individual behavior
and the ability to terminate one's interests freely lies at the heart of the
ECA's philosophy.
Several sections of the ECA serve to underscore the bias towards individual contracts. Section 9 introduces the choice concerning "an individual
employment contract or a collective employment contract, with the type of
contract and the contents of the contract being, in each case, a matter for negotiation." This means that, even if a majority of employees wish to negotiate a collective agreement, the employer can cite Section 9 of the ECA and
argue for individual contracts. Not only is this destabilizing, but the International Labour Office (ILO) saw it as a repudiation of New Zealand's
membership of the ILO, since this clause, along with Section 18, fails to
promote collective bargaining. 6 Additionally, the ECA states that, without
an applicable collective contract, "each employee and the employer may
enter into such individual employment contract as they think fit,"'7 and further encouragement towards individual contracting is proffered upon expiry
of a collective contract where, in the absence of a new contract, the parties
will "be bound by an individual employment contract based on the expired
collective employment contract."' 8
Not surprisingly, this legislative backcloth served to influence employers quickly to treat employment contracts as nothing more than commercial
contracts. Indeed, Kiely and Caisley reported that, contrary to all known
contract law, employers now "persist in asserting that they do have the
'right' to unilaterally vary employment contracts."' 9 Although the ECA does
contain provisions for collective employment contracts," Dannin offers the
14. See Dannin, supra note 11.
15. Parl. Deb. (Hansard) 1429 (Apr. 23, 1991).
16. International Labour Office, 295' Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, Case No. 1698 (Nov. 1994).
17. ECA § 19(1).
18. ECA § 19(4).
19. Peter Kiely & Andrew Caisley, The Legal Status of Bargaining under the Employment Contracts Act 1991: A Review of Recent Case, in EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: NEW
ZEALAND ExPERIENcEs 55 (Raymond Harbridge ed., 1993).
20. Employment Contracts Act § 20, 1991 (N.Z.)
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Most fundamentally, the ECA does not support or promote collectivity;
thus it contains no mechanism to foster collective, as opposed to individual, negotiation outcomes. Not only does the ECA not support bargaining,
it does not require bargaining with the other party. Furthermore, it disaggregates every component of bargaining and what would be, under the
Wagner model, the process of gaining representation. Consequently, the
individual worker2 who faces the employer cannot rely on collective bargaining as an aid.
Elsewhere we have reported on the incidence of collective employment
contracts in New Zealand and in particular its preponderance to resist erosion, perhaps understandably, in larger organizations.' Nevertheless, the
boundaries between individual and collective contracts are so obscure, for
the purposes of this study it seemed sensible to focus specifically on those
employers who were willing to incur the potential transactional costs of
multiple individual contracts. Since the ECA was supposed to embody all
the ingredients for labor market efficiency and flexibility, we wished to investigate the Act's ability to deliver. Our overarching research question
concerns the relationship between employers pursuing individual contracts
and organization performance.
DATA COLLECTION

As part of a much larger research project investigating human resource
issues in three countries, we collected data on a number of variables relating
to individual employment contracts and industrial relations in New Zealand.
A mail survey was directed to the chief executive officer or managing director of New Zealand establishments using a mailing list provided by New
Zealand Post. Although we mailed questionnaires only to establishments
with a minimum of 50 employees as identified by New Zealand Post, we include in our analysis responses from a small percentage of respondents that
had reduced their workforce and subsequently dropped below the 50 employee threshold. It should also be underscored that, while we use the term
"organization" in the Article, the unit of analysis is actually the establishment or workplace. In other words, a respondent establishment may be part
of a larger organization.
Data collection was completed in 1995. For the New Zealand component of the survey, we received 782 responses for a response rate of 51 percent. However, since this Article focuses on the pursuit of individual contracts among private sector organizations, it was necessary to omit
responses from employers in the not-for-profit sector. In addition, a small

21. Ellen Dannin, Bargaining Under New Zealand's Employment Contracts Act: The
Problem of Coercion, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 455,465 (Spring 1996).
22. Clive Gilson & Terry Wagar, EnterpriseBargaining in Australia and New Zealand:
PrivateSector Comparisons, in CURRENT RESEARCH IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 11' AIRAANZ CONFERENCE 11, 138-45 (Tom Bramble et al. eds., 1997).
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number of cases were excluded from the analysis because of missing data.
As a result, the findings presented in this paper are based on 655 useable responses.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Our dependent variable was calculated on the basis of responses to
two questions. First, we asked respondents whether their organization was
unionized. Second, we also asked unionized participants the question, "do
you actively pursue individual contracts with your hourly paid workforce?"
Using this information, we classified respondents into one of three categories: non-unionized respondents (coded 0), unionized respondents that do
pursue individual contracts with their hourly paid workforce (coded 1), and
unionized respondents that do not pursue individual contracts with their
hourly paid workforce.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
While descriptive information on the pursuit of individual contracts is
informative on its own, a more important objective of this Article is to study
the relationship between the pursuit of individual contracts and several independent variables. In other words, our aim is to use statistical analyses as
a means of distinguishing organizations that were (or were not) pursuing individual contracts. More information on the measurement of these variables
is provided below.
One variable addressed the organization's economic environment.
Respondents were asked to indicate, using a six-point scale, the demand for
their organization's primary product or service over the past three years (I =
substantial increase and 6 = substantial decline). A second question focused
on the organization's opposition to unionization. This variable was based on
employer responses to the statement, "maintaining the nonunion status of
nonunion employees is very important to the organization." This variable
was measured using a six-point scale with "1" representing strong disagreement and "6" indicating strong agreement with the statement. Six variables measured various aspects of organizational strategy, change, and decision-making. Using an approach employed previously by Ng and Maki,23
respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement (I = strongly
disagree and 6 = strongly agree) with the statement, "the organization has
relied more on introducing new products/services in the marketplace than on
selling existing products/services at lower prices to stay competitive." A
low score (such as 1 or 2) on this item would suggest more of a "defender
strategy," a score in the mid-range (3 or 4) would represent more of an

23. Ignace Ng & Dennis Maki, Trade Union Influence on Human Resource Management
Practices,33 INDUS. REL. 121, 135 (1994).
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"analyzer" strategy, and a higher score (5 or 6) would be more indicative of
a "prospector" strategy.
Six-point scales were used to measure investment in new technology
(1 = no investment and 6 = substantial investment); short-term focus (1 =
low pressure and 6 = high pressure to focus on short-term profits); and emphasis on obedience to authority (1 = strongly disagree and 6 = strongly
agree with the statement, "the organization emphasizes obedience to
authority"). Permanent workforce reduction was a dichotomous variable (1
= permanent workforce reduction over the past three years and 0 = no reduction).
Progressive decision-making ideology was derived from Gol 2 4 and calculated by averaging employer responses to three items reflecting the use of
participative decision-making, the explanation of proposed changes to those
affected, and the presence of open channels of communication. Each of
these items was measured using a six-point scale (1 = strongly disagree and
6 = strongly agree). Cronbach's coefficient alpha, a measure of the reliability of the scale, was .82. Four employer demographic characteristics were
also included in the analysis. They were the number of years the establishment has been in operation, whether the establishment was part of a larger
organization (1 = yes; 0 = no), the size of the establishment (natural logarithm of the number of employees), and the industry sector (1 = service; 0 =
manufacturing).
RESULTS: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Means and standard deviations for the independent variables are reported in Table 1. With reference to characteristics of the sample, the mean
number of employees per establishment was 388. However, there was considerable variation in size, with 32 percent of organizations having less than
100 employees, 54 percent having between 100 and 499 employees, and 14
percent having 500 employees or more. About 49 percent of the employers
were in manufacturing, while 51 percent were in service-related industries.
When considering the number of years the organization had been in operation, the average for the sample was 46 years. Almost three-quarters (74
percent) of respondents indicated that they were part of a larger organization, and 35 percent reported having permanently reduced the workforce
over the past three years. On average, respondents indicated that demand for
their primary product / service had increased slightly over the past 3 years
(mean score of 2.6), there had been some investment in new technology
(mean score of 4.1), and there was a modest degree of obedience to authority (average score of 3.4).
A breakdown of employers on the basis of organizational strategy re24. Ian Goll, Environment, Corporate Ideology, and Involvement Programs, 33 J.
INDUS. REL. 138, 149 (1991).
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vealed that almost 24 percent were more closely aligned with a defender
strategy, just under 47 percent were in the analyzer category, and close to 30
percent were in the prospector group. Respondents, on average, agreed that
there was pressure to focus on short-term profits (mean of 4.5), a desire to
have non-union employees remain union-free (mean of 3.9), and a moderately positive decision-making ideology (mean of 4.4).
THE PURSUIT OF INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTS

Prior to examining the factors associated with the pursuit of individual
contracts, we provide some basic information on the presence of individual
contracts. Of the 655 respondents, 246 (37.6 percent) were not unionized,
136 (20.8 percent) were unionized and actively pursuing individual contracts with their hourly workforce, and 273 (41.7 percent) were unionized
but not actively pursuing individual contracts." In other words, about
one-third of unionized establishments were pursuing individual contracts.
Since the dependent variable consists of three distinct categories,
multinomial logit is an appropriate estimation technique to examine the relationship between the pursuit of individual contracts and the independent
variables.2" Note that in the multinomial logit estimations, the comparison
group is the one comprised of employers that are not unionized. The results
comparing non-unionized employers and unionized employers pursuing individual contracts are provided in Model 1 of Table 3, and the findings
comparing non-unionized employers and unionized employers not pursuing
individual contracts are contained in Model 2 of Table 3.
Demand for the employer's primary product or service was not significantly associated with the pursuit of individual contracts by unionized employers. However, there was a modest positive relationship (p <.10) when
comparing non-unionized organizations and unionized establishments that
had not pursued individual contracts; such unionized establishments were
more likely to indicate that demand for their primary product or service had
declined. Opposition to unionization was an important variable distinguishing unionized and non-unionized employers. Both union groups (that is,
those pursuing individual contracts and those which were not) were significantly less likely (p <.01) to support the position that maintaining the nonunion status of nonunion employees is very important to the organization.
When considering the strategic orientation of the employer, the results
suggest that unionized employers pursuing individual contracts were more
likely (p <.05) to place their focus on cutting costs, as opposed to introducing new products or services, to remain competitive. In addition, modest
evidence existed that both union groups were under less pressure to focus on
short-term profits compared with their nonunion counterparts (p <.10 for the
25. See Table 2, Appendix.
26. WILLIAM GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYsIs (2d ed. 1993). See Table 3, Appendix.
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union group pursuing individual contracts and p <.05 for the union group
not pursuing such contracts). In addition, the probability of permanent
workforce reduction was higher among employers in the two union categories. However, progressive decision-making ideology was not significantly
associated with the pursuit of individual contracts. Two demographic characteristics of the organization were also statistically significant (at p <.01).
Compared with nonunion employers, unionized respondents (including both
those pursuing and not pursuing individual contracts) were more likely to be
larger in size and less likely to be in the service sector.
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE AND INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTING

While examining the factors that distinguished the pursuit of individual
contracts as a primary objective in this Article, we also investigated whether
the pursuit of individual contracts was associated with management perceptions of performance/workplace outcomes. It should be emphasized that our
measures of performance/workplace outcomes are perceptual. While it can
be argued that managers may be biased in their assessments, there is a
growing body of literature acknowledging the use of perceptual measures.'
Furthermore, because our unit of analysis is the establishment, using published financial measures was not an option.
In the survey, respondents were asked to provide their perceptions of
current performance and change in performance over the past five years.
Consistent with past research using a different data set, our factor analysis
produced three distinct factors.28 The first factor, which we labeled
"economic performance," addressed issues such as productivity, product or
service quality, and customer-client satisfaction. The second factor, which
we called "employee quality of work life," focused on issues such as morale, commitment to the organization, and employee satisfaction. The third
factor, entitled "employer-employee relations," dealt with issues such as the
rate of grievances, absenteeism, employee turnover, resistance to change,
and conflict within the organization. Each of the three scales was calculated
by averaging the results across all of the relevant items contained in the
scale.
Contrary to our expectations, we found little evidence of a relationship
between the pursuit of individual contracts and the various performance/workplace outcome measures. Rather, a number of other variables
were significantly associated with performance/workplace outcomes. In
27. Kim Cameron, Strategies for Successful Organizational Downsizing, 33 HuM.
RESOURCE MGMT. 189, 211 (1994); John T. Delaney & Mark A. Huselid, The Impact of Human Resource Management Practices on Perceptions of Organizational Performance, 39
ACAD. MGMT. J. 949, 969 (1996); John Godard, Whither Strategic Choice, 36 J. INDus. REL.
206, 206-28 (1997).
28. TERRY WAGAR, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PRACICES AND ORGANIZATIONAL
PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM ATLANTIC CANADA (1994).
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particular, enhanced performance was associated with greater levels of investment in new technology, the following of a "prospector" strategy in
which the focus is on new product/service development, and the presence of
a "progressive decision-making ideology" that encourages participative decision-making and open communications. In addition, organizations reporting a permanent reduction of the workforce generally had less favorable
performance scores. This result suggests that the pursuit of individual contracts, on their own, is not sufficient to enhance performance markedly.
Rather, workplace strategies and practices appear to be much more important.
DIscusSION
On a number of levels, the findings that we present here are counterintuitive to our expectations. In the first place, it is important to mention some
significant caveats to the frequencies that we report here. Although only approximately one-third of unionized employers in our survey responded that
they are actively seeking individual contracts, our survey instrument was
not capable of effective discrimination regarding more sophisticated employer behavior. It is entirely possible that employers are in fact using individual contracts that are so similar in nature that they are effectively collective in all but name, but arrived at without any bargaining process. Although
we have tried to factor this phenomenon out of our instrument, we are not
confident that we have entirely succeeded. More importantly, our survey
cut-off point of organizational size of 50 and over misses out on the vast
majority of New Zealand employers who manage much smaller non-union
operations for whom collectively negotiated contracts are not feasible." For
these reasons, we are confident in saying that we are underrepresenting the
incidence of direct individual contracting and failing to record what are essentially individual contracts that are being reported by employers as collective. Only more qualitative, detailed case studies can address this dilemma.
However, behind the statistical models lie some quite remarkable findings that directly invert our own hypotheses, but more importantly, provide
considerable assaults on the statutory foundations of the ECA and their expected outcomes. Far from inducing new innovation and workplace flexibility, the pursuit of individual contracts in unionized organizations is typically found to be associated with simple cost-cutting exercises, defensive
business strategies, workforce reduction, and a marked absence of any form
of progressive decision-making. Most dramatic of all, however, despite intensive review of all available data, we cannot find a single statistically significant or reliable relationship between organizations pursuing individual

29. Our own data clearly indicate that union coverage is positively correlated to organizational size.
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contracts and our exhaustive measures of firm performance. On the contrary, those that are reporting enhanced performance are those that embrace
a prospector strategy which is highly correlated with product innovation.
This result goes hand in hand with our measures of progressive decisionmaking ideology that capture consent-based communication activity within
the organization.
Little here demonstrates that the ECA has delivered what it promised
with respect to workplace reform and organizational performance. We
strongly suspect that the rhythms of the workplace are more collectively
based than the drafters of the ECA fundamentally understood. Moreover, we
argue that the ECA encourages employers to take a wrong turn. By their
own reporting, New Zealand employers have demonstrated that the pursuit
of individual contracts has not produced superior organizational performance.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

S.D.
0.936
1.463
1.328
1.293
1.104
1.174
0.477
0.848
37.153
0.439
1.083
0.500

2.605
Market Demand
Opposition to Unionization
3.907
3.621
Strategic Orientation
Investment in New Technology 4.101
4.473
Short-term Focus
3.440
Obedience to Authority
Permanent Workforce Reduction 0.350
4.392
Progressive Decision-Making
46.330
Years in Operation
0.740
Multi-Establishment
Number of Employees (Nat'l Log)5.135
0.508
Service
Table 2: Pursuit of Individual Contracts
Category

Number

Non-union Establishment
Unionized Establishment - Pursuing
Individual Contracts
Unionized Establishment Not Pursuing
Individual Contracts
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Percentage
37.6
20.8

41.7
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Table 3: Multinomial Logit Estimation Results
Variable

Model 1

-0.101
(0.127)
Opposition to Unionization
-0.312 ***
(0.086)
Investment in New Technology -0.0660.092)
Strategic Orientation
-0.175 **
(0.088)
Short-term Focus
-0.182 *
(0.107)
Obedience to Authority
0.160
(0.103)
Permanent Workforce Reduction 0.572 **
(0.243)
Progressive Decision-Making
-0.068
(0.137)
Years in Operation
0.001
(0.003)
Multi-Establishment
-0.446
(0.273)
Number of Employees (Nat'l Log) 0.323 ***
(0.117)
Service
-0.798 ***
(0.233)
Constant
1.396
(1.201)
Market Demand

Model 2
0.205 *
(0.114)
-0.613 ***
(0.079)
0.055
(0.085)
-0.011
(0.082)
-0.188 **
(0.095)
0.076
(0.093)
0.320
(0.225)
-0.028
(0.127)
0.004
(0.003)
-0.531 **
(0.246)
0.522 ***
(0.109)
-1.569 ***
(0.213)
1.200
(1.101)

Notes: * significant at p <.10; ** significant at p<.05; *** significant at
p <.01; standard errors are in parentheses; Manufacturing is the omitted
category when considering industry sector.
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